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[Lucas (1976)] has expressed the view that it makes no sense to think
of the government as conducting one of several possible policies while at
the same time assuming that agents remain certain about the policy rule
in eﬀect.
Cooley, LeRoy, and Raymon (1984, p. 468)
Explicit modelling of the connection of expectation-formation mecha-
nisms to policy [regime] in an accurately identiﬁed model would allow
better use of the data.
Sims (1982, p. 120)
I. Introduction
In an important strand of literature that studies the macroeconomic eﬀects of changes
in monetary policy regime, the prevailing assumption is that private agents form ratio-
nal expectations with respect to all shocks and underlying uncertainties. At the same
time, perhaps paradoxically, it is also assumed that whenever monetary policy enters
a particular regime, agents will naively believe that the regime will last forever. For
example, the inﬂuential work by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000), along with Lubik
and Schorfheide (2004) and Boivin and Giannoni (2006), studies macroeconomic ef-
fects of two diﬀerent monetary policy rules, corresponding to the pre-Volcker regime
and the post-Volcker regime. By studying the two subsample periods separately, they
reach a conclusion that changes in monetary policy help explain the substantial decline
in macroeconomic volatility observed in the post-war U.S. economy. The practice of
splitting the sample into subsamples reﬂects the simplifying assumption that after ob-
serving a regime shift, agents believe that the current regime will prevail permanently.
Such a simpliﬁcation does not square well with possible changes in future monetary
policy regime. This point has been elaborated by Sims (1982), Sargent (1984), Barro
(1984), Cooley, LeRoy, and Raymon (1984), and Sims (1987), among others. These
authors argue that in an economy where past changes in monetary policy rules are
observable and future changes are likely, rational agents will form a probability dis-
tribution over possible policy shifts in the future when forming expectations.
1 The
diﬀerence in equilibrium outcomes between a model that ignores probabilistic switches
1This argument essentially reﬂects the rational expectations view in that agents form expectations
by using all available information, including possible changes in future policy. The rational expecta-
tions concept is pioneered by Muth (1961) and Lucas (1972), and advanced by Sargent and Wallace
(1975), Barro (1976), and Lucas (1976), among others, in the context of policy evaluations.ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS AND THE GREAT MODERATION 3
in future policy regime and a model that takes into account such expected regime
switches reﬂects the key expectation-formation aspect of the Lucas critique, as implied
by the ﬁrst epigraph. We call this diﬀerence the “expectation eﬀect of regime shifts”
in monetary policy.
The goal of this paper is twofold. First, we would like to assess the quantitative
importance of the expectation eﬀect of regime shifts in monetary policy based on a
DSGE model. If the expectation eﬀect turns out to be small, then the equilibrium
outcome in a model that rules out future regime changes can be a good approximation
to the rational expectations equilibrium. If the expectation eﬀect turns out to be large,
however, it will be crucial to assess the equilibrium consequences of expected regime
shifts in monetary policy. Second, we would like to examine whether or not, when the
expectation eﬀect is accounted for, the model is still capable of predicting the Great
Moderation when monetary policy shifts from the dovish regime to the hawkish regime.
Our DSGE model explicitly connects the expectation-formation mechanism to regime
shifts in the systematic component of monetary policy, as advocated by Sims (1982).
The model features nominal rigidities in the form of staggered price setting and dynamic
inﬂation indexation, and real rigidities in the form of habit formation (e.g., Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans 2005, henceforth CEE). Monetary policy follows a Taylor
rule, under which the nominal interest rate is adjusted to respond to its own lag and
deviations of inﬂation from its target value and of output from its trend. We generalize
the standard DSGE model by allowing coeﬃcients in the monetary policy rule as well
as the duration of price contracts and the degree of inﬂation indexation to change
over time. We consider two monetary policy regimes. The ﬁrst regime represents a
policy that responds to inﬂation weakly (a dovish regime), and the second represents
a policy that responds to inﬂation aggressively (a hawkish regime). Regime changes
follow a Markov-switching process, as in Hamilton (1994). We view this kind of regime-
switching structural model as a starting point to study the quantitative importance of
expectation eﬀects of regime switching in monetary policy, as emphasized by Sims and
Zha (2006) and Cecchetti, et al. (2007).
2 To isolate the role of policy changes, we keep
the shock processes invariant across policy regimes.
2There has been a growing literature on Markov-switching rational expectations models. See, for
example, Andolfatto and Gomme (2003), Leeper and Zha (2003), Schorfheide (2005), Svensson and
Williams (2005), Davig and Leeper (2007), and Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2007). Following this
strand of literature, we generalize the standard DSGE model by allowing the possibility of changes
in policy regime to be part of the economic information set. An interesting issue that remains to be
addressed is to what extent the probability of a regime shift is aﬀected by the state of the economyASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS AND THE GREAT MODERATION 4
Based on our DSGE model with regime shifts in monetary policy, we obtain the
following results:
² The expectation eﬀect of regime change is asymmetric across regimes. Under
the dovish policy regime, the volatilities of inﬂation and output are signiﬁcantly
lower when agents take account of the probability of a switch to the hawkish
policy regime than when they naively believe that the dovish regime will persist
indeﬁnitely. Under the hawkish policy regime, however, the expectation eﬀect is
small. The asymmetric expectation eﬀects arise because equilibrium dynamics
are nonlinear functions of the model parameters.
² The importance of the expectation eﬀect depends more on how strong the
propagation mechanisms are and less on how persistent the prevailing regime is.
The stronger the propagation mechanisms are, the more impact the expectation
of future regime change will have on the equilibrium evolution of inﬂation and
output. While in theory the expectation eﬀect disappears if the prevailing
regime lasts indeﬁnitely, we ﬁnd that in practice the expectation eﬀect under
the dovish policy regime is quantitatively important even if the regime is very
persistent.
² Although expectations of regime switches dampen the ﬂuctuations in inﬂation
and output under the dovish regime, we ﬁnd that a switch from the dovish
regime to the hawkish regime can nonetheless lead to a sizable reduction in
the volatility of both inﬂation and output provided that ﬁrms’ pricing behav-
ior (characterized by the price-stickiness and inﬂation-indexation parameters)
varies with policy regime.
Understanding the expectation eﬀects of regime shifts helps bridge the gap between
two polar approaches in the DSGE literature: one that does not allow for any switch
in the systematic component of monetary policy and one that allows for switches in
monetary policy regime but does not allow private agents to form expectations about
possible changes in future policy. Since the expectation eﬀect under the dovish regime
can considerably alter the dynamics of key macroeconomic variables, caution needs to
be taken in interpreting empirical models that are used to ﬁt a sample that covers the
period with the dovish regime. In the hawkish policy regime, on the other hand, the
expectation eﬀect is small even if agents expect that the regime will shift to the dovish
regime with a non-trivial probability. Thus, even if a newly instituted hawkish regime
or by the factors other than economic ones. This issue is important enough to deserve a separate
investigation.ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS AND THE GREAT MODERATION 5
is not perfectly credible, such as the Volcker disinﬂation studied by Goodfriend and
King (2005), inﬂation ﬂuctuations can still be eﬀectively stabilized. Our results also
have important empirical implications. Fitting a regime-switching DSGE model to the
data takes into account the potentially important expectation eﬀects of regime shifts.
Because it does not require splitting a long sample into short subsamples, one can
obtain more precise estimates of the “deep” parameters that do not vary with policy
regime.
II. An Illustrative Example
To illustrate how the expectation eﬀect can arise and to examine some key properties
of the expectation eﬀect, we present in this section a simple model with regime shifts
in monetary policy. The model is simple enough for us to obtain closed-form analytical
results.
II.1. The simple model. Consider an endowment economy in which a one-period









subject to the budget constraint
Ptct + Bt = Ptyt + Rt¡1Bt¡1;
where ct denotes consumption, yt denotes the endowment, Pt denotes the price level,
Bt denotes the agent’s holdings of the bond, and Rt¡1 denotes the nominal interest
rate between period t ¡ 1 and t. The parameter ¯ 2 (0;1) is a subjective discount
factor and the parameter ° > 0 measures the relative risk aversion. The endowment
follows the exogenous stochastic process
yt = yt¡1¸exp(zt); zt = ½zt¡1 + "t; (1)
where ¸ ¸ 1 measures the average growth rate of the endowment, ½ 2 (0;1) measures
the persistence of the endowment shock, and "t is an i.i.d. normal process with mean
zero and variance ¾2
z.











which describes the trade-oﬀ between spending a dollar today for current consumption
and saving a dollar for future consumption.ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS AND THE GREAT MODERATION 6






where ¼t = Pt=Pt¡1 is the inﬂation rate, ¼¤ denotes the inﬂation target, st denotes the
realization of monetary policy regime in period t, Ást is a regime-dependent parameter
that measures the aggressiveness of monetary policy against deviations of inﬂation from
its target, and · is a constant. Monetary policy regime follows a Markov-switching
process between two states: a dovish regime characterized by st = 1 and 0 · Á1 < 1
and a hawkish regime by st = 2 and Á2 > 1. The transition probability matrix Q = [qij]
is a 2 £ 2 matrix with qij = Prob(st+1 = ijst = j). Each column of Q sums up to 1 so
that q21 = 1 ¡ q11 and q12 = 1 ¡ q22.
Market clearing implies that ct = yt and Bt = 0 for all t. Using the goods market








Thus, higher consumption (or income) growth requires a higher real interest rate.
II.2. Steady state and equilibrium dynamics. Given the stochastic process (1) for
the endowment, an equilibrium in this economy is summarized by the Euler equation
(4) and the monetary policy rule (3). The variables of interest include the inﬂation
rate ¼t and the nominal interest rate Rt.
A steady state is an equilibrium in which all shocks are shut oﬀ (i.e., "t = 0 for all







Let · = ¸°
¯ ¼¤. It follows from the Euler equation (4) and the interest rate rule (3) that







Although monetary policy switches between the two regimes, the steady-state solution
does not depend on policy regime and thus allows us to log-linearize the equilibrium
conditions around the constant steady state.
Log-linearizing the Euler equation (4) around the steady state results in
^ Rt = Et^ ¼t+1 + °½zt; (5)
where ^ Rt and ^ ¼t denote the log-deviations of the nominal interest rate and the inﬂation
rate from steady state. Equation (5) implies that, following a positive shock to zt, theASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS AND THE GREAT MODERATION 7
real interest rate will rise. This result reﬂects that an increase in zt leads to a rise in
expected consumption growth and thus a rise in the real interest rate. Log-linearizing
the interest rate rule (3) around the steady state leads to
^ Rt = Ást^ ¼t: (6)
Combining (5) and (6), we obtain the single equation that describes inﬂation dynamics:
Ást^ ¼t = Et^ ¼t+1 + °½zt; st 2 f1;2g: (7)
II.3. The MSV solution. We now discuss our approach to solving the model (7)
for equilibrium dynamics of inﬂation. Throughout this paper we follow Boivin and
Giannoni (2006) by focusing on the minimum-state-variable (MSV) solution advocated
by McCallum (1983).
The state variable in the simple model (7) is the shock zt. Thus the solution takes
the form ¼t = ®stzt, where ®st is to be solved for st 2 f1;2g. The following proposition
gives the analytical solution.
Proposition 1. The MSV solution to the regime-switching model (7) is given by







Á1 ¡ ½q11 ¡½q21






with the implicit assumption that the matrix above is invertible.
Proof. See Appendix A.1. ¤









The following proposition establishes that the volatility of inﬂation in the dovish regime
decreases with the probability of switching to the hawkish regime and that the volatility
of inﬂation in the hawkish regime increases with the probability of switching to the
dovish regime. Thus, the expectation of regime switch aﬀects inﬂation dynamics.
Proposition 2. Assume that the matrix
A =
"
Á1 ¡ ½q11 ¡½q21
¡½q12 Á2 ¡ ½q22
#ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS AND THE GREAT MODERATION 8
is positive deﬁnite. Then the MSV solution given by (8) has the property that ®j > 0







Proof. See Appendix A.2. ¤
II.4. Expectation eﬀects. The solution (8) takes into account possible switches of
future policy regime. This solution in general diﬀers from that obtained under the
simplifying assumption that agents believe that the current regime will continue per-
manently. The diﬀerence between these two solutions is what we call the expectation
eﬀect of regime switching.
To examine the underlying forces that drive the expectation eﬀect, we consider the
solution that rules out regime shifts in future policy, which is equivalent to solving the
following model
Áj^ ¼t = Et^ ¼t+1 + °½zt; (10)
where Áj (j = 1;2) does not depend on time. The equilibrium condition (10) is a
special case of the condition (7) with q11 = 1 for j = 1 and with q22 = 1 for j = 2. The
solution to (10) is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The MSV solution to the model described in (10) is
^ ¼t = ¹ ®jzt; ¹ ®j =
°½
Áj ¡ ½
; j 2 f1;2g; (11)
where it is assumed that Áj 6= ½.
Proof. See Appendix A.3. ¤
The solution represented by (11) implies that the standard deviation of inﬂation








The expectation eﬀect of regime switches can be measured by the magnitude j®j¡¹ ®jj
for j = 1;2. Because ¹ ®j does not depend on transition probabilities, Proposition 2
implies that the less persistent the regime j is, the more signiﬁcant the expectation
eﬀect j®j ¡ ¹ ®jj becomes. Similarly, it follows from the solutions (8) and (11) that if the
endowment growth follows an i.i.d. process (½ = 0), we have ®j = ¹ ®j = 0 for j 2 f1;2g.
In other words, if the shock has no persistence, inﬂation will be completely stabilized
regardless of monetary policy regime. There is no expectation eﬀect of regime shifts. IfASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS AND THE GREAT MODERATION 9
the shock is persistent, the solutions (8) and (11) will be diﬀerent, and the expectation
eﬀect will exist.
II.5. Asymmetry. As one can see from (8), ®j is the nonlinear function of the model
parameters. This nonlinearity implies that when the probabilities of switching are
the same for both regimes (i.e., when q11 = q22), the expectation eﬀect may not be
symmetric across the two regimes. This result is formally stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4. Assume that q11 = q22. If Á1 > ½, then
j®1 ¡ ¹ ®1j





Proof. See Appendix A.4. ¤
In the dovish regime, as we show in Proposition 2, the expectation of switching to the
hawkish regime stabilizes inﬂation ﬂuctuations; in the hawkish regime, the expectation
of switching to the dovish regime destabilizes inﬂation. Proposition 4 establishes that
the stabilizing eﬀect in the dovish regime exceeds the destabilizing eﬀect in the hawkish
regime.3 Moreover, the expectation eﬀect becomes more asymmetric if the shock is
more persistent, if monetary policy takes a stronger hawkish stance against inﬂation
in the hawkish regime, or if policy is less responsive to inﬂation in the dovish regime.
III. The DSGE Model
The theoretical results obtained in the previous section provide insight into why
the expectation eﬀect exists and how it can be asymmetric across regimes. But how
important is the expectation eﬀect of regime shifts? How does the expectation eﬀect
change equilibrium dynamics when monetary policy shifts from the dovish regime to the
hawkish regime? We address these issues in the context of a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model of the kind that has become a workhorse for quantitative
monetary analysis.4
The model economy is populated by a continuum of households, each endowed with
a unit of diﬀerentiated labor skill indexed by i 2 [0;1]; and a continuum of ﬁrms,
3In this simple model, it turns out that the percentage changes in the standard deviation of inﬂation
are equal across the two regimes. In a more general setup such as our baseline DSGE model below,
the expectation eﬀect is asymmetric across regimes both in terms of levels (as stated in Proposition
4) and in terms of percentage changes.
4See, for example, Galí and Gertler (1999), Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000), Ireland (2004),
Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), CEE (2005), Boivin and Giannoni (2006), and Del Negro, et al. (2007).ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS AND THE GREAT MODERATION 10
each producing a diﬀerentiated good indexed by j 2 [0;1]. Households consume a
composite of diﬀerentiated goods. Firms use a composite of diﬀerentiated labor skills
as an production input. The composites of goods and labor skills are produced in a
perfectly competitive aggregation sector. The monetary authority follows an interest
rate rule, in which the policy parameters depend on the realization of a particular
policy regime. The policy regime st follows the same Markov-switching process as
described in Section II.1.
III.1. The aggregation sector. The aggregation sector produces a composite labor
skill denoted by Lt to be used in the production of each type of intermediate goods and a
composite ﬁnal good denoted by Yt to be consumed by each household. The production
of the composite skill requires a continuum of diﬀerentiated labor skills fLt(i)gi2[0;1]
as inputs, and the production of the composite ﬁnal good requires a continuum of



















where µwt 2 (1;1) and µp 2 (1;1) are the elasticity of substitution between the skills
and between the goods, respectively. We allow the elasticity of substitution between
diﬀerentiated skills to be time-varying to capture ineﬃcient labor market wedges, as
we will explain further below.
Firms in the aggregation sector face perfectly competitive markets for the composite
skill and the composite good. The demand functions for labor skill i and for good j
















where the wage rate ¹ Wt of the composite skill is related to the wage rates fWt(i)gi2[0;1]




and the price ¹ Pt of the






III.2. The intermediate good sector. The production of a type j good requires
labor as the only input with the production function
Yt(j) = ZtLt(j)
®; 0 < ® · 1; (15)ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS AND THE GREAT MODERATION 11
where Lt(j) is the input of the composite skill used by the producer of intermediate
good j and Zt is an exogenous productivity shock identical across intermediate-good
producers and follows the stochastic process
Zt = Zt¡1¸ºt; (16)
where ¸ measures the deterministic trend of Zt and ºt is a stochastic component of Zt.
The stochastic component follows the stationary process
logºt = ½º logºt¡1 + "ºt; (17)
where ½º 2 (0;1) and "ºt is an i.i.d. white noise with mean zero and variance ¾2
º.
Each ﬁrm in the intermediate-good sector is a price-taker in the input market and a
monopolistic competitor in the product market where it can set a price for its product,
taking the demand schedule in (14) as given. We follow Calvo (1983) and assume
that pricing decisions are staggered across ﬁrms. We generalize the standard Calvo
framework in two dimensions. First, we allow the frequency of price adjustments to
depend on monetary policy regime. In particular, we assume that the probability that
a ﬁrm cannot adjust its price is given by ´t ´ ´(st). Under this speciﬁcation, ´t is a
random variable that follows the same stationary Markov process as does the monetary
policy regime. A special case with ´t = ´ for all t corresponds to the standard model
with the Calvo (1983) price-setting. Second, following Woodford (2003) and CEE
(2005), we allow a fraction of ﬁrms that cannot re-optimize their pricing decisions to
index their prices to the overall price inﬂation realized in the past period. Unlike
Woodford (2003) and others, however, we assume that the fraction of indexation varies
with the monetary policy regime. Speciﬁcally, if the ﬁrm j cannot set a new price, its





where ¼t = ¹ Pt= ¹ Pt¡1 is the inﬂation rate between t ¡ 1 and t, ¼ is the steady-state
inﬂation rate, and °t ´ °(st) measures the regime-dependent degree of indexation. We
view these extensions of the Calvo (1983) framework essential to study the eﬀects of
potential changes in monetary policy regime, especially in light of the Lucas (1976)
critique.5
5The standard Calvo model with a constant fraction of re-optimizing ﬁrms is, in our view, not
suitable for studying the eﬀects of potentially large shifts in monetary policy regime. Our concern
is not so much about the time-dependent nature of price setting in the Calvo model. Indeed, some
studies show that in an environment with low and stable inﬂation, the main implications of the
Calvo model can be well approximated by a model with the state-dependent price setting, since mostASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS AND THE GREAT MODERATION 12
Under this generalized Calvo (1983) framework, a ﬁrm that can renew its price








t+i(j) ¡ Vt+i(j)]; (19)
where Dt;t+i is the period-t present value of a dollar in a future state in period t + i,
and Vt+i(j) is the cost of production. The term Ât;t+i comes from the price-updating










k=0(1¡°t+k) if i ¸ 1
1 if i = 0:
(20)
























where ©t+i(j) denotes the nominal marginal cost of production, which can be obtained
by solving the ﬁrm’s cost-minimizing problem. Given the production function (15),











According to the optimal price-setting equation (21), the optimal price is a markup
over an average of the marginal costs for the periods in which the price will remain
eﬀective. Clearly, if ´t = 0 for all t (that is, if prices are perfectly ﬂexible in all periods),
then the optimal price would be a constant markup over the contemporaneous marginal
cost.
of the price adjustments occur at the intensive margin while the fraction of ﬁrms adjusting prices
remains relatively stable (e.g., Gertler and Leahy (2006) and Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005)). Such
approximations are likely to break down in an environment with highly variable inﬂation (such as
that in the 1970s) or if changes in monetary policy regime are large (such as the change from the
pre-Volcker regime to the Volcker-Greenspan-Bernanke regime). In these situations, the fraction of
price-adjusting ﬁrms is likely to change across diﬀerent regimes. Allowing the fraction of adjusting
ﬁrms to depend on the monetary policy regime, an approach that we take here, essentially captures
this regime-switching feature without sacriﬁcing the tractability of the standard Calvo model.ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS AND THE GREAT MODERATION 13
III.3. Households. There is a continuum of households, each endowed with a diﬀer-
entiated labor skill indexed by i 2 [0;1]. Household i derives utility from consumption,
















where ¯ 2 (0;1) is a subjective discount factor, Ct(i) denotes the household’s consump-
tion of the ﬁnal composite good, Ct¡1 denotes aggregate consumption in the previous
period, Mt(i)= ¹ Pt is the real money balances, and Lt(i) represents hours worked. The
parameter b measures the importance of habit formation in the utility function (e.g.,
Campbell and Cochrane (1999)). The variable at denotes a preference shock that
follows the stationary process
logat = ½a logat¡1 + "at; (24)
where 0 · ½a < 1 and "at is an i.i.d. normal process with mean zero and variance ¾2
a.
In each period t, the household faces the budget constraint
¹ PtCt(i)+EtDt;t+1Bt+1(i)+Mt(i) · Wt(i)L
d
t(i)+Bt(i)+Mt¡1(i)+¦t(i)+Tt(i); (25)
for all t ¸ 0. In the budget constraint, Bt+1(i) is a nominal state-contingent bond that
represents a claim to one dollar in a particular event in period t + 1, and this claim
costs Dt;t+1 dollars in period t; Wt(i) is the nominal wage for i’s labor skill, ¦t(i) is
the proﬁt share, and Tt(i) is a lump-sum transfer from the government.
The household takes prices and all wages but its own as given and chooses Ct(i),
Bt+1(i), Mt(i), and Wt(i) to maximize (23) subject to (25), the borrowing constraint
Bt+1 ¸ ¡B for some large positive number B, and the labor demand schedule Ld
t(i)
described in (14).







where Vlt(i) and Uct(i) denote the marginal utilities of leisure and of consumption,
respectively, and ¹wt = µwt
µwt¡1 measures the wage markup. Since the wage-setting
decisions are synchronized across households, in a symmetric equilibrium all households
set an identical nominal wage and make identical consumption-saving decisions as well.
Henceforth, we drop the household index i.
The wage markup ¹wt follows the stochastic process
log¹wt = (1 ¡ ½w)log¹w + ½w log¹w;t¡1 + "wt; (27)ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS AND THE GREAT MODERATION 14
with ½w 2 (0;1) and "wt being a white noise process with mean zero and variance ¾2
w.
The wage markup ¹wt can also be interpreted as a time-varying wedge in the optimal
labor-supply decision.














where Rt = [EtDt;t+1]¡1 is the nominal risk-free rate.
III.4. Monetary policy. Monetary policy is described by an interest rate rule that













where ~ Yt = Yt=Zt is detrended output, ¼¤ is the target rate of inﬂation, and the policy
parameters ·(st), ½r(st), Á¼(st), and Áy(st) are regime dependent. The term "rt is a
shock to monetary policy and follows an i.i.d. normal process with mean zero and
variance ¾2
r. The state st represents monetary policy regime and its stochastic process
is given in Section II.1. We assume that the shocks "rt, "at, "wt, and "ºt are mutually
independent.
Given monetary policy, an equilibrium in this economy consists of prices and allo-
cations such that (i) taking prices and all nominal wages but its own as given, each
household’s allocation and nominal wage solve its utility maximization problem; (ii)
taking wages and all prices but its own as given, each ﬁrm’s allocation and price solve its
proﬁt maximization problem; (iii) markets clear for bond, money balances, composite
labor, and composite ﬁnal goods.
IV. Equilibrium Dynamics
We now describe the equilibrium dynamics. Because the productivity shock Zt in the
model contains a trend, we focus on a stationary equilibrium (i.e., the balanced growth



















We make appropriate transformations of the relevant variables to induce stationarity.
The variables to be transformed include aggregate output, consumption, real money
balances, and the real wage. In equilibrium, all these variables grow at the same rate
as does the productivity shock, so we divide each of these variables by Zt and denote
the resulting stationary counterpart of the variable Xt by ~ Xt = Xt=Zt.
IV.1. The steady state. We now describe the steady-state equilibrium, where all
shocks are turned oﬀ. The steady-state equilibrium can be summarized by the solution
to the four equilibrium conditions: the optimal pricing decision (21), the optimal wage-
setting decision (26), the intertemporal Euler equation (28), and the Taylor rule (30).
Once consumption and the nominal interest rate are solved from these equilibrium
conditions, we can obtain the real money balances from (29).
The optimal pricing equation (21) implies that in a steady state, the real marginal






~ W ~ Y
1=®¡1; (31)
where ~ W = W
PZ denotes the transformed real wage and ~ Y = Y
Z denotes transformed
output.
The wage-setting decision (26) implies that the real wage in the steady state is given
by a constant markup over the marginal rate of substitution (MRS):









where we have used the market clearing condition that aggregate consumption equals
aggregate output in equilibrium.
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In the steady-state equilibrium, there is a classical dichotomy. The real variables ~ Y
and ~ W are determined by the ﬁrst two equations (31)–(32), while the nominal variables
¼ and R are determined by the other two equations (33)–(34) once the real variables
are determined.
Although the monetary policy rule is regime-dependent, the steady state is inde-





where ~ Y can
be solved from the “real part” of the equilibrium system (i.e.,(31)–(32)). With ·(s) so








IV.2. Equilibrium dynamics. We now study the log-linearized system of equilibrium
conditions around the deterministic steady state described above. We focus on the key
equations that characterize the equilibrium dynamics.
The log-linearized optimal pricing equation is given by








(~ yt ¡ ~ yt¡1 + ^ ºt)
¸








(1 ¡ ¯¹ ´)(1 ¡ ´(st¡1))
´(st¡1)
1
1 + µp(1 ¡ ®)=®
;
¹ ´ is the ergodic mean of the random variable ´(st), ^ ¼t denotes the inﬂation rate, ~ yt
denotes detrended output, ^ ºt denotes the productivity shock, and ^ ¹wt denotes the
cost-push shock.
Equation (36) generalizes the standard Phillips curve by introducing partial index-
ation and, more importantly, regime-dependent frequencies of price adjustments and
inﬂation indexation. In the special case where ´t = ¹ ´ and °t = ° for all t, this equation
reduces to the standard Phillips curve relation with partial indexation as in Woodford
(2003) and Giannoni and Woodford (2003) (augmented with habit formation). If we
further impose that ° = 0 and b = 0 so that there is no indexation and no habit
formation, then (36) collapses to the pure forward-looking Phillips-curve relation with
the real marginal cost represented by a deviation of output from its trend. In general,
because the frequency of price adjustments (measured by 1 ¡ ´t) and the degree of
inﬂation indexation (measured by °t) are regime dependent, the Phillips curve rela-
tion is no longer linear. The non-linearity poses a challenge for computation of the
equilibrium, an issue that we will address in Section VI.ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS AND THE GREAT MODERATION 17






















(¸ ¡ b)(1 ¡ ½a)
¸
^ at; (37)
where ^ Rt = log(Rt=R) denotes the nominal interest rate. In the special case with no
habit formation (i.e., b = 0), equation (37) collapses to the standard intertemporal
Euler equation that relates expected output growth to the real interest rate.
The log-linearized interest rate rule is given by
^ Rt = ½r(st) ^ Rt¡1 + (1 ¡ ½r(st))[Á¼(st)^ ¼t + Áy(st)~ yt] + "rt: (38)
V. Parameterization
The parameters in our regime-switching model include “deep” parameters that are
invariant to policy regimes and regime-dependent parameters. The deep parameters
include ¯, the subjective discount factor; b, the habit parameter; », the inverse Frisch
elasticity of labor supply; ®, the elasticity of output with respect to labor; µp, the
elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated goods; ¹w and ½w, the mean and the
AR(1) coeﬃcient of the cost-push shock process; ¸, the trend growth rate of produc-
tivity; ½a and ½º, the AR(1) coeﬃcients of the preference shock and of the productivity
growth processes; and ¾r, ¾a, ¾w, and ¾º, the standard deviations of the monetary
policy shock, the preference shock, the cost-push shock, and the technology shock.
The regime-dependent parameters include policy parameters ½r, Á¼, and Áy and the
stickiness and indexation parameters ´ and °.
The values of the parameters that we use in this paper are summarized in Table 1.
These parameter values correspond to a quarterly model. We set ¸ = 1:005 so that the
average annual growth rate of per capital GDP is 2%. We set ¯ = 0:9952 so that, given
the value of ¸, the average annual real interest rate (equal to ¸=¯) is 4%. Following
the literature, we set b = 0:75, which is in the range considered by Boldrin, Christiano,
and Fisher (2001). The parameter » corresponds to the inverse Frisch elasticity of
labor supply, which is small (Pencavel, 1986) according to most micro-studies. We set
» = 2, corresponding to a Frisch elasticity of 0:5. We set ® = 0:7, corresponding to
a labor income share of 70%. The parameter µp determines the steady-state markup.
Some studies suggest that the value-added markup is about 1:05 when factor utilization
rates are controlled for; without such a correction, it is higher at about 1:12 (Basu and
Fernald, 2002). Other studies suggest an even higher value-added markup of about 1:2ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS AND THE GREAT MODERATION 18
(with no correction for factor utilization) (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997). In light of
these studies, we set µp = 10 so that the steady-state markup is 1:1. For the parameters
governing the shock processes, we set ½a = 0:9, ½º = 0:2, ½w = 0:9, ¾a = 0:25, ¾r = 0:2,
¾w = 0:4, and ¾º = 0:2.
For the regime-dependent parameters, we consider two monetary policy regimes.
The ﬁrst regime (the dovish regime) corresponds to the Mitchell-Burns policy, which
does not take a strong stance against inﬂation ﬂuctuations. The second regime (the
hawkish regime) corresponds to the Volcker-Greenspan-Bernanke regime under which
price stability is a primary goal. We set ½r = 0:55 for both regimes. The value 0.55 is
in line with the estimate obtained by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) for the pre-Volcker
regime. In our thought experiment, we set this value to be the same in both regimes for
the purpose of isolating the eﬀects of regime changes in policy’s endogenous responses
to inﬂation and output.6 As we will show later, structural breaks show up signiﬁcantly
in the equilibrium dynamics of the interest rate even though ½r is held the same across
regimes. Based on the estimates obtained by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000), we set
Á¼1 = 0:83, Á¼2 = 2:15; and Áy1 = 0:27, Áy2 = 0:93. These values of policy parameters
are consistent with the estimates obtained by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004).
As discussed widely in the literature, the dovish regime tends to be destabilizing the
economy and can lead to large ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and output. In that regime, we
assume that ﬁrms adjust prices more frequently. For the ﬁrms that cannot optimize
prices, they are more likely to choose inﬂation indexation under the dovish regime than
under the hawkish regime. Consequently, we set ´(1) = 0:66 and ´(2) = 0:75, so that
price contracts last on average for 3 quarters under the dovish regime and 4 quarters
under the hawkish regime; we set °(1) = 1 and °(2) = 0, so that there is full indexation
under the dovish regime and no indexation under the hawkish regime. These values are
reported in Panel C of Table 1. In Panel B, we consider a diﬀerent thought experiment
in which both ´ and ° are ﬁxed across regimes so that only regime changes are in the
policy responses to inﬂation and output.
The literature suggests a wide range of values for ´. The work by Eichenbaum
and Fisher (2007) suggests that, in a standard Calvo model with mobile capital, the
estimated value of ´ based on the postwar US data can be as high as 0:85, although
a lower value in the neighborhood of 0:66 can be obtained if capital inputs are ﬁrm
speciﬁc. CEE (2005) also obtain an estimate of ´ = 0:66. The survey by Taylor (1999)
suggests a value of ´ = 0:75, while the study by Bils and Klenow (2004) based on the
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disaggregate consumer price data suggests more frequent price changes, with half of
prices lasting 5:5 months or less. Our parameterized value of ´ lies within the range
of these empirical studies. The relatively longer duration of price contracts under
the hawkish regime, as we have assumed, is consistent with the ﬁnding by Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004) that price stickiness has increased in the post-1982 period.
For the parameters in the transition matrix Q, we set q11 = 0:95 and q22 = 0:95
(and accordingly, q21 = 0:05 and q12 = 0:05). These parameter values imply that both
regimes are very persistent. In our quantitative analysis, we experiment with other
values of transition probabilities to ensure the robustness of our results.
VI. Solving the Regime-Switching Structural Model
Our model has two non-standard features that pose a challenge for computation.
First, since we consider both the dovish regime and the hawkish regime of monetary
policy, our parameterization allows for equilibrium indeterminacy. Second, since we
allow some key parameters to vary with the monetary policy regime, the equilibrium
system is in general non-linear when the policy regime follows a stochastic Markov
switching process. Thus, the standard methods for solving rational expectations models
such as those described by Blanchard and Kahn (1980), King and Watson (1998), and
Uhlig (1999) do not apply. To solve our regime-switching model, we use the generalized
MSV approach developed by Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2006), which utilizes the
canonical VAR form of Sims (2002).
Since the parameters in the equilibrium system depend on regimes in period t and
t ¡ 1 (in particular, the parameters in the Phillips curve relation (36)), it is useful to
deﬁne a “composite regime” that includes all possible realizations of regimes in periods
t and t ¡ 1. Denote the composite regime by
~ st = fst;st¡1g = f(1;1);(1;2);(2;1);(2;2)g










q11 q11 0 0
0 0 q12 q12
q21 q21 0 0








where qij’s are the elements in the Q
2£2
matrix.
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² n = number of all variables (including expectation terms) for each regime, as
in the Gensys setup
² m = number of fundamental shocks
² ~ h = number of policy regimes
² h¤ = number of shock regimes
² n1 = number of equations in each regime
² n2 = number of expectation errors
² n3 = number of ﬁxed-point equations
² ~ Q = ~ h £ ~ h matrix of transition matrix, whose elements sum up to 1 in each
column
In our model, we have n = 8, m = 4, ~ h = 4, h¤ = 1, n1 = 6, n2 = 2, n3 = n2(~ h¡1) = 6.
We can now rewrite the equilibrium conditions described in (36) - (38) and the shock















xt = [^ ¼t; ~ yt; ^ Rt;^ at; ^ ¹wt; ^ ºt;Et^ ¼t+1;Et~ yt+1]
0
is a 8 £ 1 vector of variables to be solved and
"t = ["rt;"at;"wt;"ºt]
0
is a 4 £ 1 vector of shocks.
The coeﬃcient matrices A~ st and B~ st in (39) involve parameters that are possibly
regime-dependent. To ﬁx the notation, we introduce the following deﬁnitions:
°1(~ st) = °(st¡1); °0(~ st) = °(st);
Ã1(~ st) = Ã1(st;st¡1); Ã2(~ st) = Ã2(st¡1);
½r(~ st) = ½r(st); Á¼(~ st) = Á¼(st); Áy(~ st) = Áy(st);
which have the following properties:
°0(~ st = 1) = °0(~ st = 2); °0(~ st = 3) = °0(~ st = 4);
°1(~ st = 1) = °1(~ st = 3); °1(~ st = 2) = °1(~ st = 4);
Ã2(~ st = 1) = Ã2(~ st = 3); Ã2(~ st = 2) = Ã2(~ st = 4);
½r(~ st = 1) = ½r(~ st = 2); ½r(~ st = 3) = ½r(~ st = 4);
½¼(~ st = 1) = ½¼(~ st = 2); ½¼(~ st = 3) = ½¼(~ st = 4);
½y(~ st = 1) = ½y(~ st = 2); ½y(~ st = 3) = ½y(~ st = 4):ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS AND THE GREAT MODERATION 21
We now ﬁll in the matrices A~ st, B~ st, and ª using the three equilibrium conditions
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Ã2(~ st)b










¡(1 ¡ ½(~ st))Á¼(~ st) ¡(1 ¡ ½(~ st))Áy(~ st) 1 0 0 0 0 0
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¸¡b 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 ¡ b
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0 0 ½(~ st) 0 0 0 0 0
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0 0 0 0 ½w 0 0 0
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¾r 0 0 0
0 ¾a 0 0
0 0 ¾w 0













Following Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2006), we can expand the system under each
regime, described above, into an expanded linear system to obtain the MSV solution.
Appendix B describes the detail of how to form this expanded system.
VII. Quantitative Analysis
Since monetary policy regime has switched a number of times through the U.S. his-
tory, a regime-switching DSGE model of the type studied in this paper is a natural
starting point for quantitative analysis. In this section we use the parameterization
discussed in Section V to answer the following questions. How important is the expec-
tation eﬀect of regime switches? What are the key properties of the expectation eﬀect?
How does the expectation eﬀect alter the equilibrium dynamics of macroeconomic vari-
ables? For this purpose, we compare the equilibrium implications from two versions
of our model, one in which agents naively believe that the existing policy regime willASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS AND THE GREAT MODERATION 22
persist indeﬁnitely and one in which agents take into account probabilistic switches in
future policy regime. Within each version of the model we also study two cases, one
that has regime shifts in policy only (Panel B in Table 1) and the other that allows
the parameters ´ and ° that govern ﬁrms’ pricing behaviors to vary with policy regime
(Panel C in Table 1).
VII.1. Asymmetric expectation eﬀects. To gauge the importance of the expecta-
tion eﬀect of a shift in policy regime, we compare the dynamic behavior of macroeco-
nomic variables in our regime-switching model with that in the version of the model
in which agents naively assume that the current regime would last indeﬁnitely.
We begin by examining the case with regime switches in policy but with constant ´
and ° (Panel B in Table 1). Figure 1 displays the impulse responses of inﬂation, output,
the ex ante real interest rate, expected inﬂation, expected output, and the real marginal
cost under the dovish regime. At the top of the graphs, “MP” stands for a monetary
policy shock, “Demand” for a preference shock, “Cost-push” for a cost-push shock, and
“Tech” for a technology shock. Within each graph, two sets of impulse responses are
plotted. One corresponds to the version of the model where agents naively assume
that the current regime will last indeﬁnitely (the solid line), and the other corresponds
to the baseline version of our model where agents take regime switching into account
in forming their expectations (the dashed line). The diﬀerence between these two sets
of impulse responses captures the expectation eﬀects of regime shifts in policy. As
shown in Figure 1, even if agents expect the policy to shift from the dovish regime to
the hawkish regime with a modest probability of only 5%, the dynamic responses of
all variables (particularly those following a demand shock or a cost-push shock) are
substantially dampened. If we allow the dovish regime to be less persistent so that it is
more likely to switch to the hawkish regime, the expectation eﬀect of regime switching
can be further magniﬁed.
Figure 2 displays the impulse responses in the hawkish regime. Although the ex-
pectation of regime switching to the dovish regime make the responses slightly more
volatile, the model ignoring such an expectation eﬀect nonetheless approximates the
regime-switching model well. This result is consistent with the view that monetary
policy is more eﬀective in an environment with a low inﬂation target (Bernanke and
Mishkin, 1997; Mishkin, 2004; Goodfriend and King, 2005).
To measure the quantitative importance of the expectation eﬀect and the magnitude
of its asymmetry across regimes, we compute the volatilities of inﬂation, output, and
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model, which takes the following reduced form
xt = G1;stxt¡1 + G2;st²t; (40)
where matrices G1;st and G2;st are functions of the structural parameters. To derive the
unconditional volatility of xt for regime j (j = 1;2), we ﬁx G1;st = G1;j and G2;st = G2;j









The unconditional volatility of xt in regime j is measured by the square root of the
diagonal of ­tot
j . The ﬁrst three elements of xt are the variables inﬂation, output, and
the nominal interest rate, and their volatilities thus computed are reported in Table 2.
The strong expectation eﬀect in the dovish regime and the lack of it in the hawkish
regime are evident by comparing the results across Panels A and B in Table 2. In the
dovish regime, the expectation of a shift to the hawkish regime leads to a large decline
in macroeconomic volatility. The table shows that the unconditional volatility falls
by 76.5% (from 3:00 to 0:7) for inﬂation, 72.0% (from 1:19 to 0:33) for output, and
76.4% (from 2:59 to 0:61) for the nominal interest rate. In comparison, in the hawkish
regime, the expectation of a shift to the dovish regime has a much smaller eﬀect on
macroeconomic volatility.7
VII.2. Endogenous propagation. Endogenous propagation mechanisms in our model
play an important role in generating the asymmetric expectation eﬀects of regime
switches. A stronger propagation mechanism through, for example, a stronger strate-
gic complementarity in price setting gives rise to more persistent dynamics of inﬂation
and output. As we have alluded to in Section II, more persistent dynamics, be it from
exogenous shock persistence or from endogenous propagation, tend to generate larger
and more asymmetric expectation eﬀects of regime shifts. Thus, if we weaken the
strategic complementarity, we should expect that expectation eﬀects of regime shifts
become smaller and less asymmetric.
To illustrate this point, we set µp = 5 (corresponding to a steady-state markup of
25%) and ´ = 0:33 (corresponding to an average duration of price contract of one and
a half quarters), and we focus on the case with constant private-sector parameters.
These new parameter values imply a larger value of Ã2 in equation (36) and thus
7The small expectation eﬀect of regime switches in the hawkish regime holds even when the regime
is much less persistent (e.g., when q22 = 0:7). On the other hand, the expectation eﬀect in the dovish
regime remains very strong if we set q11 = 0:98 and q22 = 1:0, the probabilities that might ﬁt into
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a weaker strategic complementarity in ﬁrms’ price-setting decisions in the sense of
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000), Huang and Liu (2001, 2002), and Dotsey and
King (2006). With a weaker strategic complementarity, as shown by these authors,
inﬂation and output dynamics become less persistent.
Figures 3 and 4 display the impulse responses of equilibrium variables under the
parameterization with µp = 5 and ´ = 0:33. Compared to the impulse responses
with the baseline parameterization reported in Figures 1 and 2, the expectation eﬀects
are much smaller and less asymmetric. These results highlight the importance of
endogenous propagation for generating large, asymmetric expectation eﬀects of regime
shifts.
VII.3. Changes in ﬁrms’ pricing behavior. We now examine the case in which
both the price-stickiness parameter ´ and the inﬂation-indexation parameter ° vary
with policy regime. As we have argued, these parameters are likely to change with
policy regime, especially when we consider a potentially large change in policy. Figures
5 and 6 display the impulse responses of macroeconomic variables under the dovish and
the hawkish regimes. Similar to the case with constant ´ and °, the eﬀects of expecting
the policy to switch from the dovish regime to the hawkish regime (captured by the
diﬀerences between the solid and dashed lines in Figure 5) are substantial, but the
eﬀects of expecting the policy to switch from the hawkish regime to the dovish regime
(Figure 6) are quite small. In fact, the expectation eﬀect of regime switches in the
hawkish regime is smaller in comparison with the result from the model with policy
change only (c.f. Figure 1). Thus, the asymmetry of expectation eﬀects is stronger in
this case. These results are summarized in Table 3 where, when the expectation eﬀect
is accounted for, the volatilities of of inﬂation, output, and the nominal interest rate
are substantially reduced in the dovish regime but have little change in the hawkish
regime.
VII.4. The Great Moderation. The results discussed in the previous sections show
that expectations about changes in future monetary policy can play an important role in
aﬀecting the dynamics of macroeconomic variables. Since these expectation eﬀects can
signiﬁcantly dampen the macroeconomic volatility under the dovish policy regime, the
following questions naturally arise. Are there signiﬁcant diﬀerences in macroeconomic
volatility across the dovish and hawkish regimes? What role do changes in ﬁrms’
pricing behavior play when we allow the relevant parameters ´ and ° to vary with
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These questions are important because the volatility of both inﬂation and output in
the U.S. economy has declined substantially since the 1980s. This kind of reduction in
macroeconomic volatility is dubbed the “Great Moderation” (Stock and Watson, 2003)).
Although what may have caused the Great Moderation is still open to debate, there is
a broad consensus that monetary policy played a large role in achieving lower inﬂation
variability (e.g., Bernanke (2004)). Since output volatility and inﬂation volatility have
moved together in the last thirty years, both in the United States and in other industrial
economies (e.g., Blanchard and Simon (2001)), Bernanke (2004) suggests that monetary
policy may have also played a nontrivial role in moderating output variability as well.
Figure 7 displays the impulse responses of macroeconomic variables in the model
with regime changes in policy only (see Panel B in Table 1). The ﬁgure shows that as
monetary policy switches from the dovish regime (the solid line) to the hawkish regime
(the dashed line), the responses of inﬂation to each of the three shocks are visibly
dampened. To measure how much of the volatility is reduced for each variable, Panel
B in Table 2 shows that when monetary policy switches from the dovish regime to the
hawkish regime, the volatility of inﬂation is substantially lowered from 0:70 to 0:18
(a reduction of about 73:8%) and the interest-rate volatility falls by about 51% from
0:61 to 0:30. This ﬁnding is consistent with the view that monetary policy has played
an important role in achieving inﬂation stability. However, switching from the dovish
regime to the hawkish regime does not lead to as much of a reduction in the volatility
of output: the output volatility falls by about 32% from 0:33 to 0:22.
As we have discussed, changes in monetary policy may aﬀect ﬁrms’ price-setting
behavior. To examine the consequence of allowing ﬁrms’ behavior to respond to changes
in policy regime, we now consider the case in which both the price-stickiness parameters
´ and the inﬂation-indexation parameter ° vary with policy regime (Panel C in Table
1). Figure 8 reports the impulse responses for this case. Compared to the case with
constant ´ and ° (Figure 7), allowing ﬁrms’ behavior to vary with policy regime helps
dampen the response of output, in addition to dampening the responses of inﬂation and
the nominal interest rate. Panel B in Table 3 shows that as policy switches from the
dovish regime to the hawkish regime, not only inﬂation and the interest rate become
more stable but also the volatility of output is reduced substantially. In particular,
the output volatility falls by more than a half from 0:35 to 0:16. These ﬁndings lend
support to the view that monetary policy may have played an important role in the
Great Moderation.8
8The Great Moderation is stronger when we set q11 = 0:98 and q22 = 1:0.ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS AND THE GREAT MODERATION 26
VII.5. Propagation Eﬀect vs. Magniﬁcation Eﬀect. A regime shift in mone-
tary policy aﬀects equilibrium dynamics through two channels: a propagation eﬀect
(through the G1st matrix in (40)) and a magniﬁcation eﬀect (through the G2st matrix).
To understand the transmission mechanism of regime switches in monetary policy, it is
necessary to separate these two eﬀects on the unconditional volatility of macroeconomic
variables (Cogley and Sargent, 2005).9
In Appendix C, we discuss our approach of separating the propagation eﬀect from
the magniﬁcation eﬀect of regime changes in monetary policy. Table 4 reports the
percentage reductions in the unconditional volatility as well as its decomposition when
monetary policy shifts from the dovish regime to the hawkish regime.10 The table
shows that a shift in policy regime substantially reduces the unconditional volatilities
of inﬂation and the nominal interest rate, regardless of whether or not ﬁrms’ pricing
behavior varies with policy regime (Panel A in Table 4). The bulk of such a volatility
reduction is accounted for by the propagation eﬀect (Panels B and C in Table 4). When
the price-stickiness parameter and the indexation parameter are held constant across
regimes, a shift of monetary policy from the dovish regime to the hawkish regime leads
to a modest reduction in the unconditional volatility of output (about 32%), with the
propagation eﬀect slightly smaller than the magniﬁcation eﬀect (15% v. 19%). When
these private-sector parameters are allowed to vary with policy regime, however, a
switch of policy from the dovish regime to the hawkish regime leads to a substantial
decline in the unconditional volatility of output (about 53%) and the propagation eﬀect
becomes more important than the magniﬁcation eﬀect (37% v. 24%).
VIII. Conclusion
We have studied a standard DSGE model where monetary policy follows a Markov
switching process between two distinct regimes: a dovish regime under which the
9Since we assume that the variances of fundamental shocks remain constant over time, our thought
experiment sidesteps the important question of whether changes in monetary policy or changes in the
distribution of shocks have been more important for explaining the Great Moderation. To address
that question requires estimating a DSGE model with regime shifts in both policy and shock variances,
which is beyond the scope of this paper. For some recent studies on the relative importance of policy
versus shocks, see Stock and Watson (2003), Cogley and Sargent (2005), Primiceri (2005), Sims and
Zha (2006), and Gambetti, Pappa, and Canova (forthcoming).
10The percentage reductions in volatility attributable to the propagation eﬀect and to the magniﬁ-
cation eﬀect are not supposed to sum up to the percentage reductions in the unconditional volatility
because of the nonlinearity in our decomposition. The relationship is approximately multiplicative,
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policy responds weakly to ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and a hawkish regime under which
the price stability is a top priority. Our study represents a concrete step to fulﬁll the
rational expectations research program outlined by Sims (1982), Sargent (1984), Barro
(1984), Cooley, LeRoy, and Raymon (1984), and Sims (1987). We have shown that
(1) because macroeconomic dynamics are nonlinear functions of the underlying model
parameters, the expectation eﬀect of regime switches in monetary policy is asymmetric
across regimes and (2) by allowing ﬁrms’ pricing behavior to vary with policy regime,
the volatility of both inﬂation and output can be signiﬁcantly reduced when policy
switches out of the dovish regime into the hawkish regime.
Since the expectation eﬀect can be quantitatively important under the dovish policy
regime, it should not be ignored in the DSGE model that aims at assessing the impact
of a regime change in historical monetary policy. In the hawkish policy regime, on the
other hand, the expectation eﬀect of future policy change is quantitatively insigniﬁcant.
This asymmetric ﬁnding oﬀers an explanation of why the post-1980 monetary policy
in the United States has been successful in reducing the volatility of both inﬂation and
output, despite agents’ disbelief that the hawkish policy will last forever (Goodfriend
and King, 2005).
We have also shown that the reduction in macroeconomic volatility can be attributed
more to a regime change in the persistence of equilibrium dynamics of the variables
than to that in the size of reduced-form shock variances. Therefore, a structural break
in the persistence parameters may provide an essential transmission mechanism for
reducing macroeconomic volatility. We hope that the quantitative ﬁndings obtained
in this paper will help motivate researchers to take up a challenging task of estimating
a regime-switching DSGE model to a long sample that covers diﬀerent policy regimes
and structural breaks.
Appendix A. Proofs of Propositions
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1. We solve the model (7) by the method of undetermined
coeﬃcients. Given the solution form ^ ¼t = ®stzt for st 2 f1;2g, (7) implies that
Á1®1zt = q11®1½zt + q21®2½zt + °½zt;
Á2®2zt = q12®1½zt + q22®2½zt + °½zt;
where we have used the relation Etzt+1 = ½zt. Matching the coeﬃcients on zt, we
obtain
Á1®1 = q11®1½ + q21®2½ + °½; (A1)ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS AND THE GREAT MODERATION 28
Á2®2 = q12®1½ + q22®2½ + °½: (A2)
It follows that the solution [®1;®2]0 is given by the expression in (8).
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2. Denote by ® = [®1;®2]0 and C = °½[1;1]0. The MSV
solution in (8) can be rewritten as
® = A
¡1C:
Since A is positive deﬁnite, ®1 and ®2 are both positive.
To establish the ﬁrst inequality in (9), we impose the relation q11 = 1 ¡ q21 and
























°½2(Á2 ¡ q22½)(Á1 ¡ Á2)
det(A)2 < 0;





°½2(Á1 ¡ q11½)(Á2 ¡ Á1)
det(A)2 :
Since A is assumed to be positive deﬁnite, we have det(A) > 0 so that




This inequality, along with the assumption that Á2 > Á1, implies that
@®2
@q12 > 0.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 3. Given the solution form ^ ¼t = ¹ ®jzt, we have Et^ ¼t+1 =
¹ ®j½zt and (11) is a result from matching the coeﬃcients of zt.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 4. The solution for the regime-switching model (8) can
be rewritten as
®j =
qij½ + Ái ¡ qii½
det(A)
; ij 2 f1;2g; i 6= j:ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS AND THE GREAT MODERATION 29
Using the solution for the constant regime model in (11), we have
¹ ®1 ¡ ®1












det(A) ¡ (Á1 ¡ ½)(q21½ + Á2 ¡ q22½)







The desired inequality in (12) follows from the assumptions that q11 = q22 and Á2 > Á1.
Appendix B. The Expanded Model
To solve the model described in (39), we stack all variables under each regime and
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Appendix C. Propagation v. Magnification
To separate the propagation eﬀect from the magniﬁcation eﬀect of regime changes
in monetary policy, let us begin with the simple example
^ ¼t = ½st^ ¼t¡1 + ¾st²t;
where ²t is an i.i.d. process with the standard normal distribution. In regime j (j =



















As one can see from (A4), the change in the unconditional volatility can be decomposed
into two components, one attributable to regime-induced changes in persistence, which
we call the propagation eﬀect (measured by the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side), and
the other attributable to regime-induced changes in shock variances, which we call the
magniﬁcation eﬀect (measured by the second term on the right-hand side).
We perform a similar analysis for the higher-dimensional process (40). The uncondi-
tional volatility of xt for regime j (j = 1;2) can be calculated according to (41). When
policy shifts from the dovish (ﬁrst) regime to the hawkish (second) regime, how much
of the change in the unconditional volatility can be attributed to the propagation eﬀect
and how much to the magniﬁcation eﬀect? Because xt is in general multi-dimensional,
one cannot obtain an exact decomposition as in the univariate example represented by
(A4). One can, however, obtain an approximate decomposition.
We begin by computing the volatility attributable to the magniﬁcation eﬀect (mea-
sured by the matrix G2;j for regime j). According to Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen
(1993), the magniﬁcation eﬀect in regime j can be characterized by the impulse re-








where s0 = j and sk (k = 1;:::;t) evolves according to the Markov-switching process.
To get the overall variation described by the stochastic processes It;j for t = 1;:::;1ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS AND THE GREAT MODERATION 32
amounts to computing the covariance matrix ­shk
j = Extx0
t with G2;st = G2;j for all t
in (40). This covariance matrix is
vec(­
shk




where ¹ qj is the ergodic probability for regime j. The volatility of xj associated with the
shock-covariance matrix G2;j (j = 1;2) is measured by the square root of the diagonal
of ­shk
j .




t with G1;st = G1;j for all t in (40) as
vec(­
per
j ) = (I ¡ G1;j ­ G1;j)
¡1 vec(¹ q1G2;1G
0
2;1 + ¹ q2G2;2G
0
2;2): (A6)
The change in volatility due to the propagation eﬀect represented by the matrix G1;j
for regime j is given by the square root of the diagonal of ­
per
j .
Upon obtaining the decomposition of the regime-induced changes in volatility, we









1 ), where vtot
j measures the volatility computed according to (41), vshk
j
according to (A5), and v
per



























In the univariate example, this relation is exact, as revealed by (A4).ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS AND THE GREAT MODERATION 33
Table 1. Parameter values
A. “Deep” parameters
Preferences ¯ = 0:9952 » = 2 b = 0:75
Technologies ® = 0:7 ¸ = 1:005 µp = 10
Aggregate Shocks
Persistence ½a = 0:9 ½w = 0:9 ½º = 0:2
Standard dev. ¾r = 0:2 ¾a = 0:25 ¾w = 0:4 ¾º = 0:2
Regime transition prob. q11 = 0:95 q22 = 0:95
B. Regime-dependent parameters for policy change only
Regime ½r Á¼ Áy ´ °
Dovish regime 0.55 0.83 0.27 0.66 1
Hawkish regime 0.55 2.15 0.93 0.66 1
C. Regime-dependent parameters for changes in both policy and ﬁrms
Regime ½r Á¼ Áy ´ °
Dovish regime 0.55 0.83 0.27 0.66 1
Hawkish regime 0.55 2.15 0.93 0.75 0
Table 2. Eﬀects of regime shifts in policy on macroeconomic volatility
A. Ignoring Expectation Eﬀects
Inﬂation Output Interest rate
Dovish regime 3.00 1.19 2.59
Hawkish regime 0.14 0.20 0.24
B. Accounting for Expectation Eﬀects
Inﬂation Output Interest rate
Dovish regime 0.70 0.33 0.61
Hawkish regime 0.18 0.22 0.30ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS AND THE GREAT MODERATION 34
Table 3. Eﬀects of regime shifts in both policy and ﬁrms’ pricing be-
havior on macroeconomic volatility
A. Ignoring Expectation Eﬀects
Inﬂation Output Interest rate
Dovish regime 3.00 1.19 2.59
Hawkish regime 0.08 0.17 0.21
B. Accounting for Expectation Eﬀects
Inﬂation Output Interest rate
Dovish regime 0.80 0.35 0.69
Hawkish regime 0.09 0.16 0.23
Table 4. Reduction in volatility (% change) when policy shifts from
the dovish regime to the hawkish regime
A. Unconditional Volatility
Inﬂation Output Interest rate
Policy only 73.79 32.33 50.91
Policy and ﬁrms 88.76 53.02 66.12
B. Propagation Eﬀect
Inﬂation Output Interest rate
Policy only 67.65 15.10 42.72
Policy and ﬁrms 84.78 37.41 62.72
C. Magniﬁcation Eﬀect
Inﬂation Output Interest rate
Policy only 13.02 19.15 11.27



















































































































Figure 1. Regime switching in policy only: impulse responses under
the dovish policy regime. The solid line represents the responses from
the model that ignores regime shifts in future policy. The dashed line
















































































































Figure 2. Regime switching in policy only: impulse responses under
the hawkish policy regime. The solid line represents the responses from
the model that ignores regime shifts in future policy. The dashed line

















































































































Figure 3. Regime switching in policy only (with µp = 5 and ´ = 0:33):
impulse responses under the dovish policy regime. The solid line rep-
resents the responses from the model that ignores regime shifts in fu-
ture policy. The dashed line represents the responses from our regime-




















































































































Figure 4. Regime switching in policy only (with µp = 5 and ´ = 0:33):
impulse responses under the hawkish policy regime. The solid line rep-
resents the responses from the model that ignores regime shifts in fu-
ture policy. The dashed line represents the responses from our regime-



















































































































Figure 5. Regime switching in both policy and ﬁrms’ behavior: impulse
responses under the dovish policy regime. The solid line represents the
responses from the model that ignores regime shifts in future policy. The
















































































































Figure 6. Regime switching in both policy and ﬁrms’ behavior: impulse
responses under the hawkish policy regime. The solid line represents the
responses from the model that ignores regime shifts in future policy. The

















































































































Figure 7. Impulse responses in the regime-switching model with only
policy changing. The solid line represents the responses under the dovish
policy regime; the dashed line represents the responses under the hawkish


















































































































Figure 8. Impulse responses in the regime-switching model with
changes in both policy regime and ﬁrms’ behavior. The solid line rep-
resents the responses under the dovish policy regime; the dashed line
represents the responses under the hawkish policy regime.ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS AND THE GREAT MODERATION 43
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